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Introduction
A. Wayne, New Jersey Case Study

On October 29, 2011, an altercation took place among high school
1
students at a weekend house party that erupted into a community
dispute reflecting significant legal and policy questions for the proper
role of school districts in private life. According to police, two Wayne,
New Jersey high schoolers were attacked at an off-campus house party,
2
with one individual knocked unconscious. Approximately one week
3
later, police charged nine teenagers with aggravated assault. After the
criminal charges were filed, controversy erupted as some of the students
charged were stars on the Wayne Hills High School football team and
4
were slated to play in upcoming playoff football games.
On November 11, 2011, Interim School Superintendent Michael
5
Roth decided against suspending the football players. Roth cited legal
precedent and a New Jersey administrative statute restricting school
6
discipline for off-campus offenses. As a result, the students participated
7
in the first playoff football game, which the team won. However, on
November 16, 2011, Roth reversed his earlier decision and suspended
8
the players, banning them from participating in the next playoff game.
School board members remained silent for the most part, although some
9
told the press that they supported the reversal by Roth.

1
Matthew McGrath, 9 Wayne Hills students, including star football player, arrested on
assault
charges,
THE
RECORD,
Nov.
9,
2011,
http://www.northjersey.com/news/crime_courts/9_Wayne_Hills_students_.html.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Matthew McGrath and Hannan Adely, Superintendent: Law allows accused Wayne
Hills
students
to
play,
THE
RECORD,
Nov.
11,
2011,
http://www.northjersey.com/news/crime_courts/Arrested_Wayne_Hills_High_players_can_
take_part_in_tonights_playoff_game.html.
5
Id.
6
Id.; see N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:16-7.6.
7
Matthew McGrath, Officials silent on plans for accused Wayne Hills players, THE
RECORD,
Nov.
15,
2011,
http://www.northjersey.com/news/133942503_Officials_silent_on_football_decision.html.
8
Matthew McGrath, Accused Wayne Hills players barred from football, THE RECORD,
Nov.
16,
2011,
http://www.northjersey.com/news/crime_courts/111611_Accused_Wayne_Hills_players_ba
rred_from_football.html.
9
Id.
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After the superintendent’s actions, the Board of Education met on
November 16, 2011 and November 17, 2011 to discuss Roth’s new
10
decision to suspend the players. At these meetings, Wayne Hills
football players packed the public portion of the school board meeting
11
in protest of the suspensions. Chris Olsen, the school’s athletic director
and football coach, spoke out and called the suspensions a “rush to
12
justice.” He added, “Let’s say some of the boys, or all of them, are
13
found not guilty. What do we say to them? ‘We’re sorry?’” Supporters
of the players argued they should have “a chance to refute the charges,”
and cited the Duke University lacrosse controversy where players
14
accused of rape were suspended and later acquitted. Additionally, in a
closed Board of Education session, lawyers for some of the accused
players presented evidence that “at least three boys were not present
during the alleged attack,” and this “created doubt in the board’s mind”
15
about suspending the players. Based on this new information, the
16
Board stayed Roth’s suspension and scheduled another hearing.
Consequently, the accused players were allowed to play in a
17
November 18 playoff football game, which the team also won. At this
point, the football controversy “made national news,” with the Board
conceding that “the ‘majority of people’ were upset with its handling of
18
the matter.” In this light, on November 25, the Board lifted its stay on
Roth’s suspension, rendering the players ineligible for a December 3
19
championship game. In response, the players filed suit, seeking
emergent relief with the Commissioner of Education on November 28,

10

Id.
Matthew McGrath and Erik Shilling, 60 Wayne Hills players crowd into meeting,
THE
RECORD,
Nov.
17,
2011,
http://www.northjersey.com/news/crime_courts/111611_Accused_Wayne_Hills_players_ba
rred_from_football.html.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Matthew McGrath, Wayne Hills football team plays after week of controversy, THE
RECORD, Nov. 18, 2011, http://www.northjersey.com/sports/WAYNEHILLS.html.
16
Id.
17
Matthew McGrath and Patricia Alex, Assault case puts Wayne Hills football dynasty
in
tough
spot,
THE
RECORD,
Nov.
27,
2011,
http://www.northjersey.com/news/112711_Assault_case_puts_Wayne_Hills_football_dynas
ty_in_tough_spot.html.
18
Id.
19
Id.
11
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20

2011, and the Superior Court on November 29, 2011.
Hearing the lawsuit the next day on November 30, Superior Court
Judge Thomas Brogan met with attorneys for the Board and players but
21
did not make a ruling. Brogan instead deferred to the Commissioner of
Education, citing state policy that when an issue arises under school
laws, the Department of Education should have primary
22
jurisdiction. Accordingly, both sides met with Administrative Law
23
Judge Ellen Bass on December 1, 2011. That day, Bass heard
24
arguments and denied the players’ request for emergent relief.
Subsequently, in a determination rendered on December 2, the
Commissioner of Education affirmed Bass’ decision, and thus, the
players were ultimately suspended for the championship game on
25
December 3.
After three reversals in decision, the Wayne Hills School District
ultimately punished the students for their alleged conduct that occurred
entirely off school grounds. This punishment follows a new trend in
New Jersey and around the country in which school districts are
increasingly involving themselves in matters that occur beyond the
26
educational environment. In response to the Wayne Hills controversy
and other similar situations, a national debate has developed on whether
school districts should be assuming the role of disciplining students for
27
their misdeeds outside of school. There is passion on both sides of this
20

Mike Vorkunov, Suspended Wayne Hills football players appeal Board of
Education’s
decision
in
court,
THE
STAR-LEDGER,
Nov.
29,
2011,
http://www.nj.com/hssports/blog/football/index.ssf/2011/11/suspended_wayne_hills_footbal
l_players_appeal_board_of_educations_decision_in_court.html.
21
John Petrick, Wayne Hills students’ case to be subject of Newark hearing, THE
RECORD,
Nov.
30,
2011,
http://www.northjersey.com/news/Judge_defers_to_education_commissioner_on_Wayne_H
ills_suspensions.html.
22
Id.
23
Mike Vorkunov, Judge denies Wayne Hills football players’ appeal to play in state
final,
STAR-LEDGER,
Dec.
1,
2011,
http://www.nj.com/hssports/blog/football/index.ssf/2011/12/judge_denies_wayne_hills_foot
ball_players_appeal_to_play_in_state_final.html.
24
Id.
25
Matthew McGrath, Education commissioner bars Wayne Hills players from
championship,
THE
RECORD,
Dec.
2,
2011,
http://www.northjersey.com/news/passaic_morris/passaic_news/Education_commissioner_b
ars_Wayne_Hills_players_from_championship.html.
26
Laura Bruno, Schools enforce year-round conduct rules, USA TODAY, Oct. 12, 2010,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2010-10-11-school-discipline.htm.
27
Such school disciplinary policies are often referred to as 24/7 policies or “24-hour
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issue. Some school administrators argue that school districts should be
involved in off-campus affairs, as they believe school districts can better
28
reach kids through discipline. Critics charge this type of school
29
involvement goes too far and infringes on parental rights.
B. Current 24-Hour Codes in New Jersey
Most New Jersey 24-hour codes passed by individual school
districts sanction discipline for alleged drug and alcohol violations away
from school. The Randolph Board of Education in New Jersey, for
example, passed a policy that disciplined student athletes for drug and
30
alcohol possession at all times. Similarly in Haddonfield, New Jersey,
student athletes and parents are required to sign an agreement stating
that students will be disciplined for possession or use of tobacco,
31
alcohol, illegal drugs, and anabolic steroids. Finally, the Ramapo
Indian Hills Regional High School District passed a regulation that held
any violation of the New Jersey criminal code or a municipal code as a
32
student violation subject to discipline.
Other New Jersey 24-hour codes discipline students for traffic
offenses away from school. The Freehold Regional High School District
in New Jersey disciplines students for motor vehicle violations pursuant
codes,” a term this note will hereafter use. Julia Terruso, From Cranford to Ohio, school
districts weigh disciplining teens for off-campus behavior, STAR-LEDGER, Feb. 26, 2012,
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/02/cranford_school_district_weigh.html.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
The policy “disciplines high school student athletes and those in extracurricular
activities if they are caught using or in possession of drugs or alcohol – even if an incident
occurs off campus after school or on weekends.”12 No. 3 Quinlan, Student Discipline Law
Bulletin art 5. (Mar. 2010).
31
The “24/7 Drug and Alcohol Policy” prohibits “the use of tobacco in any form,
drinking, possessing or providing alcoholic beverages and/or use, possession, or providing
illegal drugs including anabolic steroids, at any time.” Doe v. Banos, 713 F. Supp. 2d 404,
408 (D.N.J. 2010).
32
The policy banned “student participants in Board-sponsored extracurricular activities
. . . from the use, possession or distribution of any alcoholic beverage or other drugs (unless
prescribed by a physician) both on and off school grounds . . . With respect to conduct
occurring away from school grounds/events, an alleged violation of the above conduct
requirements shall occur if a student is formally charged and/or arrested by law enforcement
for an alleged violation of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, and/or applicable
municipal codes or ordinance provisions.” G.D.M. and T.A.M. o/b/o B.M.M. v. Bd. of
Educ. of the Ramapo Indian Hills Reg’l High Sch. Dist. (B.M.M. II), EDU 11597-09, Final
Decision (Sept. 13, 2010) (policy was found to be unlawful by the New Jersey
Commissioner of Education).
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to an agreement with police, under which the school district receives a
list of students who receive traffic citations from the local police
33
department. The district then suspends a student’s campus parking
permit for thirty days for any off-campus moving violation, and if the
violation involves an accident, the school revokes the student’s parking
permit “for the year or until [the] legal system determines student to be
34
innocent of charges.” Similarly in Holmdel, New Jersey, the Board of
Education passed a policy that revokes a student’s on-campus parking
35
privilege for thirty days after two reported traffic offenses.
C. Overview of Note
With a principal focus on New Jersey law, this Note will first
discuss how 24-hour codes create potential constitutional violations and
public policy problems. Next, this Note will review state laws that
currently exist to address the issue of 24-hour codes. Then, this Note
will review instances where school districts have exceeded the scope of
state laws that sanction discipline for off-campus conduct. Finally, this
Note will reach conclusions about the merits of 24-hour codes and
suggest legislation to protect all the stakeholders in the educational
process by creating clarity that would prevent disputes such as the
Wayne Hills football controversy from occurring in the future.
II. 24-Hour Codes Create Constitutional Violations and Poor Policy
In a wide range of litigation, parents and students have argued that
24-hour codes are unconstitutional. Specifically, they have alleged such
codes violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution by failing to satisfy procedural or substantive due process.
This section will review the relevant case law and discuss how school
districts are potentially sanctioning unconstitutional discipline under 24hour codes. Then, this section will review various public policy
33
Freehold Regional High School District, Senior Driving Privileges/Campus Vehicle
Procedures
(Mar.
2011),
http://www.frhsd.com/district/files/Senior%20Driving%20PrivilegesCampus%20Vehicle%2
0Procedures.pdf.
34
Id.
35
The author of this Note opposed the Holmdel off-campus driving disciplinary policy
as a member of the Holmdel Township Board of Education. Jacqueline Hlavenka, Holmdel
BOE keeps student driving policy, INDEPENDENT (Monmouth Cty., N.J.), July 15, 2010,
http://ind.gmnews.com/news/2010-0715/Schools/Holmdel_BOE_keeps_student_driving_policy.html.
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considerations as they relate to 24-hour codes.
A. Procedural Due Process Challenges to 24-Hour Codes
Students have alleged they are unconstitutionally denied
procedural due process during the disciplinary process under 24-hour
36
codes. This student due process right is derived from Goss v. Lopez,
where the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that under the Fourteenth
Amendment, a suspended student is entitled to “oral or written notice of
the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the
evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of
37
the story.” The Court, however, “stopped short of requiring” that a
student be given a formal opportunity to secure counsel, confront
38
witnesses, or call witnesses.
The main caveat is that this procedural due process right is
contingent on the school discipline involving the deprivation of a
39
constitutionally protected property interest. In Goss, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that a student’s ten-day scholastic suspension triggers a
40
property interest. As a result, suspended students are afforded notice
41
and a hearing. It is unclear, though, whether procedural due process
applies to extracurricular activities, which are typically the subject of
42
discipline under 24-hour codes.
In a relevant Third Circuit case, Palmer by Palmer v. Merluzzi, a
student was caught consuming beer and smoking marijuana inside the
43
school radio station. The student received a procedural due process
36

See L.A. ex rel R.A. v. Bd. of Educ. of Wayne, EDU 14241-11, Initial Decision (Dec.
1, 2011).
37
Palmer by Palmer v. Merluzzi, 868 F.2d 90, 93 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975)).
38
Id. at 93-94 (citing Goss, 419 U.S. at 584).
39
“The threshold issue is whether the interests that could be adversely affected in the
proceeding [are] such that the due process clause was implicated.” Id. at 93; see U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deprive any person of . . . property . . . without due
process of law”).
40
Id. at 93 (citing Goss, 419 U.S. at 581).
41
Lisa L. Swem, Note, Due Process Rights in Student Disciplinary Matters, 14 J.C. &
U.L. 359, 366 (1987).
42
“The question of whether a student has a protectable interest in his continuing
participation in extracurricular activities has been faced by numerous courts with differing
results.” Palmer by Palmer v. Merluzzi, 868 F.2d 90, 97 (3d Cir. 1989) (Cowen, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
43
Id. at 91-92.
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hearing, and thereafter was suspended from school for ten days. Later,
the superintendent added a sixty-day extracurricular activities
45
suspension on top of the academic suspension. The student sued,
arguing he did not receive procedural due process when the
46
superintendent decided the additional extracurricular suspension. The
court found for the school, but overtly avoided the question of whether
the sixty-day extracurricular suspension comprised a property interest
47
requiring procedural due process.
A concurring judge addressed this issue, however, and argued that
the majority opinion “implicitly acknowledges that [the student] has a
protected property interest in his continued participation in
48
extracurricular activities.” The judge further argued that distinguishing
extracurricular activities from other academic activities is becoming an
inappropriate distinction:
[T]he notion upon which many of the New Jersey cases rely—that
participation in extracurricular activities is a mere privilege as
opposed to a right—is fast becoming outdated. Indeed, courts and
commentators increasingly attack the “privilege” versus “right”
distinction. Although New Jersey may not be constitutionally
obligated to establish and maintain a system of extracurricular
activities, many of its public schools, nevertheless, have done so.
The New Jersey statutes implicitly acknowledge the importance of
extracurricular activities. Public funds support the schools’ various
“extracurricular” activities. Further, the Commissioner of Education
has required teachers to supervise such activities when called upon
to do so. Most importantly, a growing consensus indicates that the
programs are not “extra” curriculars, but rather, are an integral part
of the whole curriculum. Authority in New Jersey does support the
proposition that “each pupil has a right to the opportunity to
participate in interscholastic athletics and other extracurricular

44

Id. at 92.
Id.
46
Id. at 91.
47
“Resolution of this appeal does not require that we address the issue found dispositive
by the ALJ and the district court – whether procedural due process is required whenever a
public school student in New Jersey faces or receives for a breach of discipline solely a
suspension from participation in his or her school’s athletic program.” Id. The court instead
reviewed the property interest in the 60-day extracurricular suspension in conjunction with
the 10-day suspension that was levied. Id.
48
Palmer by Palmer, 868 F.2d at 96 (Cowen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
45

COLLINS NOTE_FORMATTED_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

ARE PRINCIPALS DRIVING THE COP CAR?

activities.

6/14/2013 12:53 AM

357

49

Based in large part on this reasoning, the judge concluded that the
New Jersey Supreme Court would today find “a protected interest in
participation in extracurricular activities, assuming eligibility
50
requirements are met.”
Assuming arguendo that this concurring judge is correct and
procedural due process rights apply to extracurricular discipline, it is
highly questionable how school districts could constitutionally
discipline for off-campus offenses. As discussed earlier, due process in
student disciplinary matters “minimally requires adequate notice, an
opportunity for a hearing, and substantial evidence to support the
51
penalty.” When a student commits an offense at school, school
administrators act on accounts from school employees or students who
corroborate and provide evidence relating to the alleged offense. But for
alleged offenses that occur off-campus, evidence arises from either a
police report or a third-party account that is somehow relayed to school
administrators. Illustrating this, some school districts have used mere
“Facebook posts” that confirmed “gossip” about a house party where
52
there was alcohol as sufficient evidence to discipline a student.
It is difficult to imagine that unsubstantiated online chatter and
other third-party sources amount to substantial evidence, as required
53
under procedural due process. For example, as previously discussed,
the Freehold Regional School District in New Jersey revokes a student’s
parking permit after having an off-campus motor vehicle accident for
the year or “until [the] legal system determines student to be innocent of
54
charges.” The policy makes clear that the school district will suspend a
parking permit before the student has an opportunity to contest his or
her traffic citation in municipal court. As this illustrates, the current
procedures for administering 24-hour codes have a significant potential
to lack the requisite procedural due process.
While some may argue that procedural due process is inappropriate
for school discipline, past cases have shown the benefits of procedural
due process in the proper adjudication of student discipline. As
49
50
51
52
53
54

Id. at 98-99 (Cowen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
Id. at 99 (Cowen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Swem, supra note 41, at 366 (citations omitted).
Terruso, supra note 27.
See Palmer by Palmer, 868 F.2d at 93.
See supra note 33.
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discussed in the introduction, the Wayne Hills superintendent suspended
nine football players for an alleged off-campus assault pursuant to
police accounts without granting the players a procedural due process
55
hearing. The students later received a hearing before the school board,
at which point the students produced evidence that “at least three of the
56
accused players weren’t present” during the alleged assault. The school
board then stayed the suspensions, with the school board president
noting, “[t]he evidence presented at the hearing, which the board and
the superintendent had not previously had access to, raised substantial
concern regarding the nature and extent of the involvement of some of
the students in the incident . . . The stay was placed so that additional
57
facts and information could be considered.” As these comments
demonstrate, procedural due process hearings provide an essential
opportunity for a school district to consider any facts that contradict the
third-party account that the school is otherwise relying on.
In creating the student procedural due process right, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that notice and a hearing protect a student from
“unfair or mistaken exclusion from the educational process, with all its
unfortunate consequences,” such as damage to “the students’ standing
with their fellow pupils as well as interfere[nce] with later opportunities
58
for higher education and employment.” This notion is keenly
applicable to the growing adoption of 24-hour codes, where without
procedural due process, school administrators are subjecting students to
discipline based on third-party accounts without even hearing a
student’s side of the story.
From a legal standpoint, if courts find that there is a property
interest in extracurricular discipline or parking permits, then there is a
significant likelihood that the disciplinary process of 24-hour codes
would fail to meet procedural due process requirements. But even if
courts conclude that there is no property right to trigger procedural due
process, states ought to consider the fairness of student discipline under
frameworks where school districts know they are not required to afford
students notice and a hearing—let alone find substantial evidence of
off-campus misconduct. As such, states should consider legislation that
would codify the constitutional safeguards afforded under procedural
55
56
57
58

McGrath, supra note 8.
McGrath, supra note 15.
Id.
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575, 579 (1975).
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due process.
B. Substantive Due Process Challenges to 24-Hour Codes
Parents have alleged that 24-hour codes violate their parental rights
59
under the federal constitution. In Meyer v. Nebraska, the U.S. Supreme
Court held the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees parents the right to
“establish a home and bring up children” and “to control the education
60
of their own.” In subsequent cases, the Court has reaffirmed this
substantive due process right as “protect[ing] the fundamental right of
parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of
61
their children.”
The Third Circuit interpreted this right and its interaction with
public schools in Greunke v. Seip, in which a high school swim coach
62
asked a female swimmer to submit to a pregnancy test. The court
concluded “there may be circumstances in which school authorities, in
order to maintain order and a proper educational atmosphere in the
exercise of police power, may impose standards of conduct on students
63
that differ from those approved by some parents.” However, when “a
school’s policies might come into conflict with the fundamental right of
parents to raise and nurture their child[ren] . . . the primacy of the
parents’ authority must be recognized and should yield only where the
64
school’s action is tied to a compelling interest.” Thus, the court
established that the Fourteenth Amendment’s parental rights subject
certain school district actions to strict scrutiny analysis.
In a recent Third Circuit case that addressed school discipline, the
65
court rejected a parents’ substantive due process claim. In J.S. v. Blue
Mountain School District, a student was disciplined for online speech
66
that “ma[de] fun of her middle school principal.” While the court
reversed the student’s discipline on First Amendment grounds, the court
59

See Complaint, Bernal-Silva v. Borough of Mountain Lakes, No. 207CV02941, 2009
WL 1873401 (D.N.J. Apr. 3, 2009).
60
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923).
61
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
62
Greunke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 295 (3d Cir. 2000).
63
Id. at 304 (“[F]or some portions of the day, the children are in the compulsory
custody of state-operated school systems,” where “the state’s power is ‘custodial and
tutelary.’”); see also Veronia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655, 664-65 (1995).
64
Greunke, 225 F.3d at 305 (emphasis added).
65
J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
66
Id.
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rejected the parents’ Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process
67
claim. The court held “the parents’ liberty interest will only be
implicated if the state’s action ‘deprived them of their right to make
decisions concerning their child,’ and not when the action merely
68
‘complicated the making and implementation of those decisions.’”
Based on this, the Third Circuit held that the school discipline did not
prevent the parents “from reaching their own disciplinary decision” or
69
force the parents “to approve or disapprove of [the student’s conduct].”
Further, the court held the ten-day suspension in question was
70
insufficient to trigger a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest.
In a matter regarding 24-hour codes, the parents of a student who
attended a Ramapo, New Jersey high school asserted a substantive due
process claim in their challenge to a school policy that made any state or
71
municipal offense subject to school discipline. In a preliminary
decision, an administrative law judge held that the school district’s 2472
hour code violated the parents’ substantive due process rights. He
asserted that “dealing with charges against a teenager unrelated to
school is the proper function of the parents without interference from
school authorities,” and that this “is particularly true when the student’s
73
alleged misconduct occurred in the parent’s home.” Based in part on
this constitutional violation, the administrative law judge struck down
74
the Ramapo 24-hour code. The Commissioner of Education and the
New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division avoided this
constitutional question, however, and decided the case on strictly
75
statutory grounds.
Given this jurisprudence, 24-hour codes have the potential of
violating the Fourteenth Amendment’s parental substantive due process
right. While a federal court has not yet ruled in favor of a parent in a
67

Id.
Id. at 934 (citing C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 184 (3d Cir. 2005)).
69
Id.
70
Id. at 934, 922.
71
G.D.M. and T.A.M. o/b/o B.M.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Ramapo Indian Hills Reg’l
High Sch. Dist. (B.M.M. I), EDU 11579-09, Initial Decision (June 11, 2010).
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
G.D.M. and T.A.M. o/b/o B.M.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Ramapo Indian Hills Reg’l
High Sch. Dist. (B.M.M. II), EDU 11597-09, Final Decision (Sept. 13, 2010) (“In light of
the fact that [the district policy] does not comply with [state law], there is no need to explore
the constitutional arguments made by the petitioner and discussed by the ALJ.”).
68
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case concerning student discipline for off-campus conduct, the growing
number of 24-hour codes creates the likelihood of a legal challenge on
these grounds. So long as a court finds that a 24-hour code implicates a
parent’s right “to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and
control of their children,” as the New Jersey administrative law judge in
the Ramapo, New Jersey case held, the relevant 24-hour code will be
76
subject to strict scrutiny review.
While proponents believe that the policy goals of 24-hour codes
are laudable, it is difficult to argue that school discipline for conduct in
the home is narrowly tailored to address a compelling government
interest. As 24-hour codes expand in the scope of conduct that they
cover, they become less likely to satisfy a heightened standard of
review. Accordingly, the policies have the potential of violating parental
constitutional rights. Given the possibility that school districts can be
disciplining in an unconstitutional manner with these policies, it is
imperative that legislatures address the issue of 24-hour codes with
legislation that ensures school districts’ policies comport with parental
constitutional rights in the disciplining of students.
C. Public Policy Problems in 24-Hour Codes
School districts have passed 24-hour codes disciplining students
for off-campus traffic offenses, drinking offenses, and other misconduct
that are tangentially related to the school environment. While such
misdeeds are not to be condoned, this paper questions the policy
wisdom behind school disciplinary action to address these out-of-school
issues. In this section, this paper will discuss a multitude of policy
rationales that have been offered by numerous parties and weigh against
24-hour codes.
First, this Note holds that courts are the best venue for adjudging
criminal conduct that occurs away from school. As established under
state criminal law, the judicial system is fitted with the tools and
procedures needed to ensure that the safety concerns of the community
77
are addressed. Further, courts provide a better venue for assessing a
78
student’s danger to the community than schools. Since off-campus
misconduct constitutes a violation of state or municipal law, it is only
76

See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
Randee J. Waldman & Stephen M. Reba, Suspending Reason: An Analysis of
Georgia’s Off-Campus Suspension Statute, 1 J. MARSHALL L.J. 1, 67 (2008).
78
Id. at 68.
77
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fitting that the criminal justice system governs the disciplinary regime
for the offending citizen, who in these instances merely happens to be a
public school student.
Second, this Note asserts that 24-hour codes unwittingly create a
“double penalty” factor that is inequitable to students. If a student is
charged with an offense outside of school, he or she is subject to the
relevant criminal laws and is prosecuted accordingly. As criminal
statutes are designed to “maintain order in society,” they are already
written to incorporate the criminal law goals of deterrence,
79
incapacitation, and retribution. In this light, subsequent school
discipline simply adds an additional consequence on top of the
80
underlying criminal penalty.
As articulated by others who have written on this subject, 24-hour
codes can be characterized as an “overreaction on the part of the school
authorities” that “offends our sense of justice,” because “‘a precept of
justice [is] that punishment for [a] crime should be graduated and
81
proportioned to the offense.’” Since school policies “are adopted to
preserve order in the school environment,” schools should not play a
82
role in supplementing criminal statutes. As Holmdel Township Board
of Education member Ana Vander Woude stated in opposing a 24-hour
code, students “are already being punished [by the criminal justice
system] if the infraction occurs and [if] it is [then] channeled through
the school district for a second type of penalty . . . it would be
83
overlegislating.” In this instance, Vander Woude opposed Holmdel’s
aforementioned policy of revoking a student’s campus parking privilege
for off-campus traffic offenses that have already been enforced by the
84
municipal court system.

79

James M. Peden, Through a Glass Darkly: Educating with Zero Tolerance, 10 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 369, 376 (2001).
80
Avarita L. Hanson, Have Zero Tolerance School Discipline Policies Turned into a
Nightmare? The American Dream’s Promise of Equal Educational Opportunity Grounded
in Brown v. Board of Education, 9 UC DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 289, 321 (2005).
81
Peden, supra note 79, at 370 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 347, 367
(1910)).
82
Id. at 376.
83
Jacqueline Hlavenka, Police will notify school of student traffic tickets, INDEPENDENT
(Monmouth Cty., N.J.), Oct. 8, 2009, http://ind.gmnews.com/news/2009-1008/schools/005.html.
84
Id.
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Third, this Note finds that removing students from extra-curricular
activities for off-campus violations runs counter to the goals of reducing
off-campus misconduct. With respect to correcting teenage behavior,
research has shown that “responding with services that help adolescents
identify errors, recognize options, and make better choices is more
85
developmentally appropriate than a purely punitive response.” Further,
researchers have found that “instead of removing students, schools
should implement programs designed to train adolescents’ still86
developing brains to make good decisions.” Empirically, studies have
shown that students who are suspended or expelled are more likely to
87
drop out of school and become “psychologically damaged.” They also
88
are more likely to exhibit a variety of poor behaviors. Based on these
considerations, it is apparent that troubled students are best served by
remaining in an educational environment, rather than being suspended
89
and left apt to commit further off-campus malfeasance.
In a similar vein, 24-hour codes that remove students from
extracurricular activities reduce the very social benefit provided by
extracurricular activities. Empirical studies indicate that participation in
extracurricular activities reduces the rates of early school dropout,
90
especially among students at the highest risk of dropping out. If a
student receives an extracurricular suspension for consuming alcohol
off-campus, kicking the student off the football team will remove the
student from an activity that is proven to reduce delinquency. In these
cases, 24-hour codes run counter to the merits of extracurricular
programs, namely keeping at-risk youth engaged in school instead of
walking the streets.
Finally, this Note submits that 24-hour codes unnecessarily expose
school districts to potential tort liability. In a Mountain Lakes, New
Jersey case, police detained a star high school basketball player on a

85

Waldman, supra note 77, at 12-13.
Id. at 13.
87
Hanson, supra note 80, at 289, 330-31.
88
Suspended students are more likely to become involved in a physical fight, carry a
weapon, smoke, use alcohol and drugs, have sex, drop out of school, feel isolated from
society, and commit further offenses. Melanie Riccobene Jarboe, Note, “Expelled to
Nowhere”: School Exclusion Laws in Massachusetts, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 343, 34950 (2011).
89
Id.
90
Joseph L. Maloney & Robert B. Carins, Do Extracurricular Activities Protect Against
Early School Dropout, 33 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 241, 248 (1997).
86
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91

weekend night, contending she was leaving the scene of a house party.
During this encounter, the student maintained that she did not consume
alcohol, and in the end the police never filed any charges against the
92
student. Regardless, and based solely on the police account, the high
93
school suspended the girl from the basketball team. Her parents sued,
arguing that their daughter’s basketball suspension was unfounded and
94
caused her to lose collegiate scholarship opportunities. The parents
alleged numerous torts against the local school district and police
department, including tortious interference with a prospective economic
95
advantage and defamation. While the case was never tried, the local
police department settled for $50,000 and the school district settled for
96
an undisclosed amount. Given these settlements, one must ask whether
public school districts should assume such liability arising from
discipline for off-campus conduct. As 24-hour codes grow in
prevalence, there are likely to be many similar tort claims brought after
instances of unfounded discipline. Considering school districts are
publicly funded, 24-hour codes can recklessly expose taxpayers to
liability whenever off-campus discipline is improperly sanctioned.
Based on these considerations, this Note submits that 24-hour
codes present numerous public policy shortcomings. Under 24-hour
codes that are currently in operation, school districts are unilaterally
taking punitive measures that are duplicative of those already taken by
the criminal justice system. At the same time, these actions troublingly
expose school districts to tort liability while unwittingly removing atrisk students from schools.
For the policy and legal reasons discussed in this section, this Note
submits that states must craft laws that curtail the application of 24-hour
codes to specific areas where they are both constitutional and necessary
97
for the safety of a school’s operation. The next section will discuss
91
Complaint, Bernal-Silva v. Borough of Mountain Lakes, 2009 WL 1873401 (D.N.J.
Apr. 3, 2009).
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Eugene Paik, Mountain Lakes pays $50K to settle suit by former basketball standout,
STAR-LEDGER,
Feb.
2,
2010,
http://www.nj.com/news/local/index.ssf/2010/02/mountain_lakes_pays_50000_to_s.html.
97
For example, as a school board member, the author of this note promoted specific
instances where school intervention into off-campus affairs is justifiable:
“‘If there was a party over the weekend and there were two groups that get into
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how several states have attempted to limit the scope of off-campus
discipline, pursuant to principles this note supports, and yet school
districts have routinely exceeded these limitations.
III. Lack of Compliance with State Laws that Govern 24-Hour Codes
A. Overview of Laws Governing 24-Hour Codes
School discipline for off-campus conduct has historically been
sanctioned in specific instances where student conduct “poses a threat
or danger to the safety of other students, staff or school property or
98
disrupts the educational program of the school.” For example, in New
Jersey, a 1970 case laid the groundwork for the present restrictions on
99
off-campus discipline. In R.R. v. Board of Education of Shore Regional
High School District, a New Jersey court reviewed a student’s
100
suspension for an out-of-school altercation. The court said it was
unable to find a New Jersey decision holding that school officials had
the power to expel or suspend a student for conduct away from school
101
grounds. As a result, the court looked to other jurisdictions and
secondary sources, and fashioned a rule that school officials may
discipline a student for conduct away from school only when it is
“reasonably necessary for the student’s physical or emotional safety and
well-being, or for reasons relating to the safety and well-being of other

a fight and the police are aware of it, [school administrators] need to know what
happened because there could very well be spillover into the building,” Collins
said . . . ‘There are many different circumstances beyond the scope of the
imagination where administrative intervention is appropriate and necessary, but
I do believe that our policies, namely the alcohol and driving policies,
incorporate instances where [the conduct] fails [to] materially and
substantially’” interfere with the school’s operation, as required under state
statute.
Jacqueline Hlavenka, Holmdel BOE to amend controversial off-campus policy, THE
INDEPENDENT (Monmouth Cty., N.J.), Oct. 21, 2010, http://ind.gmnews.com/news/2010-1021/Schools/Holmdel_BOE_to_amend_controversial_offcampus_polic.html.
98
Ronald D. Wenkart, Discipline of K-12 Students for Conduct Off School Grounds,
201 ED. LAW REP. 531, 531 (2006).
99
R.R. v. Bd. of Ed. of Shore Reg’l High Sch. Dist., 263 A.2d 180 (N.J. Super. 1970);
see G.D.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Ramapo Indian Hills Reg’l High Sch. Dist., 427 N.J.
Super. 246, 263 (2012) (“The two-pronged test set forth in N.J.A.C. 6A:16-7.6 is derived
from the trial court’s decision in R. R. v. Board of Education of the Shore Regional High
School District . . .”).
100
Id. at 182.
101
Id. at 184.
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102

students, teachers or public school property.”
Many state laws follow this court’s approach, and overall, there is
a national trend towards limiting 24-hour codes to a “reasonableness”
standard that reaches only certain conduct that directly affects the
103
school environment. For example, in Connecticut, the legislature
passed a law that only allowed 24-hour codes to reach off-campus
conduct that “markedly interrupts or severely impedes the day-to-day
104
operation of a school.” The state teacher’s union president supported
this standard, saying the legislature’s task is to balance “students’ [due
process] rights and the rights of a class which may be disrupted [as well
105
as the rights of an] individual who is assaulted or harassed.” Similarly,
Georgia legislators restricted off-campus discipline to specific offenses
106
where a student “could be charged” with a felony. The Georgia law
also contains a second requirement that the conduct “makes the
student’s continued presence at the school a potential danger,” which
the law’s legislative sponsor said is “key” to avoid having school
districts disciplining students for off-campus offenses that do not affect
107
the school environment.
B. New Jersey Law Governing 24-Hour Codes
In order for school districts to discipline students for off-campus
conduct, they must have the legal authority to do so. In New Jersey, a
local school board’s power is “no greater than the authority conferred
108
by statute.” Therefore, to establish disciplinary authority, the state
109
must statutorily authorize the student discipline. To this end, the New
Jersey State Board of Education has administrative rulemaking power
102

Id. at 184; see N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:16-7.6 (quoted language adopted in
administrative code).
103
Daniel E. Feld, Annotation, Right to discipline pupil for conduct away from school
grounds or not immediately connected with school activities, 53 A.L.R.3D 1124 (1973).
104
Packer v. Bd. of Educ. of Thomaston, 717 A.2d 117, 134 (Conn. 1998).
105
Id. at 133.
106
Waldman, supra note 77, at 32-33.
107
Id. at 33.
108
G.D.M. and T.A.M. o/b/o B.M.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Ramapo Indian Hills Reg’l
High Sch. Dist. (B.M.M. III), EDU 13033-10, Initial Decision (July 6, 2011).
109
Waldman, supra note 77, at 32 (“First, [a statute] must be examined to determine if
the Legislature intended to limit the student behavior that school districts can punish.
Second, if it is determined that the statute does create limits, school districts’ code of
conduct provisions regulating the punishment of off-campus behavior must be examined to
determine compliance with those limits.”).
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110

and has promulgated rules addressing 24-hour codes. The relevant rule
authorizes discipline for off-campus offenses in specific cases:
(a) School authorities have the right to impose a consequence on a
student for conduct away from school grounds, including on a school
bus or at a school-sponsored function, that is consistent with the
district board of education’s code of student conduct, pursuant to
N.J.A.C. 6A:16-7.1.
1. This authority shall be exercised only when it is reasonably
necessary for the student’s physical or emotional safety, security and
well-being or for reasons relating to safety, security and well-being
of other students, staff or school grounds, pursuant to N.J.S.A.
18A:25-2 and 18A:37-2.
2. This authority shall be exercised only when the conduct which is
the subject of the proposed consequence materially and substantially
interferes with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school.
3. The consequence pursuant to (a) above shall be handled in
accordance with the district board of education approved code of
student conduct, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:16-7.1, and as appropriate,
111
in accordance with N.J.A.C. 6A:16-7.2, 7.3, or 7.5.

Pursuant to this administrative rule, New Jersey school districts may
sanction off-campus discipline by enacting 24-hour codes at the local
112
level, subject to the limits set forth in state law. School boards must
publicly vote to approve the 24-hour codes, and typically include them
113
as part of the district’s student code of conduct.
By passing laws that govern 24-hour codes, states are addressing
two important considerations that were promoted in the previous
section. First, states are addressing the policy concerns about having
school districts involved in discipline for off-campus conduct. In this
respect, state statutes serve to “ensure[] that a school board is unable to
110
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:11-1 (“The board shall . . . [e]nforce the rules of the state
board . . . [and p]erform all acts and do all things, consistent with law and the rules of the
state board, necessary for the lawful and proper conduct, equipment and maintenance of the
public schools of the district.”).
111
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:16-7.6.
112
Waldman, supra note 77, at 32.
113
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:16-7.1 (New Jersey requires that “[e]ach district board of
education . . . develop, adopt and implement a code of student conduct which establishes
standards, policies and procedures.”); see also N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:16-1.4 (“Each
district board of education shall develop and adopt written policies, procedures, mechanisms
or programs governing . . . [d]evelopment and implementation of a code of student conduct .
. .”).
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usurp the parental role unless a child’s off-campus conduct interferes
114
with the school’s legitimate custodial role.” Second, these state laws
help provide a statutory framework for school districts to follow,
helping “ensure that school board authority is exercised consistently
115
with [applicable] constitutional protections.”
C. School District 24-Hour Codes Found to Exceed
Governing State Laws
Despite some state laws that explicitly define when school districts
116
may discipline students for off-campus conduct, as discussed in the
previous section, there is evidence that school districts enact policies
that exceed these state laws. In one such case, a parent whose child
attended a Ramapo, New Jersey high school successfully challenged a
117
24-hour code for exceeding state law. The school district policy in
question established as a school conduct violation any violation of the
118
New Jersey criminal code or relevant municipal codes. The New
Jersey Commissioner of Education struck down this 24-hour code,
finding that it “encompasse[d] too many potential conduct violations
that [did] not meet the elements” required under state law before off119
campus discipline is permitted. The Commissioner further held the
state law governing off-campus conduct “emphasizes the notion that
there must be some link between the conduct and the school
120
environment” for discipline to be sanctioned.
The school district appealed this decision to the Superior Court of
121
New Jersey, Appellate Division. On appeal, the school district alleged
the Commissioner (1) misinterpreted the term “consequence” in the
state code and (2) rendered a decision that is inconsistent with other
statutes that promote responses by school authorities to “substance
114
Brief for American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 10, G.D.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Ramapo Indian Hills Reg’l High Sch.
Dist., 427 N.J. Super. 246 (App. Div. 2012).
115
Id. at 7.
116
See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:16-7.6.
117
G.D.M. and T.A.M. o/b/o B.M.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Ramapo Indian Hills Reg’l
High Sch. Dist. (B.M.M. II), EDU 11597-09, Final Decision, at 3 (Sept. 13, 2010).
118
Id. at 1, 3.
119
Id. at 7.
120
Id. (citing N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:16-7.6.)
121
G.D.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Ramapo Indian Hills Reg’l High Sch. Dist., 427 N.J.
Super. 246 (2012).
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abuse and bullying.” To start, the court found that the term
“consequence” should be interpreted according to its common meaning,
thus rendering a mandatory meeting with school administrators and/or
123
suspensions for extracurricular activities subject to state statute.
Further, the court agreed with the Commissioner that the statute requires
any off-campus conduct subject to discipline to have a “nexus” to the
“orderly administration of the school,” thus affirming the striking down
124
of the broad Ramapo policy.
While the Ramapo lawsuit represents only one school district that
violated state law, there is empirical evidence that school districts
regularly ignore state laws restricting off-campus discipline. Legal
researchers studied the disciplinary policies passed by local school
boards in Georgia and compared them to the off-campus discipline
125
requirements established under applicable state law. Georgia law
allows schools to punish for off-campus conduct only if a student (1)
“acted in a way ‘which could result in the student being criminally
charged with a felony[,]’” and (2) “that action . . . ‘makes the student’s
continued presence at school a potential danger to persons or property at
126
the school or which disrupts the educational process.’”
The
researchers found that Georgia school districts have regularly “gone
127
beyond the command” of this law. Specifically, they found that a
“majority of districts” maintained policies that deviated from state
128
law. The school district policies were inconsistent with Georgia’s
statute for many reasons, including (1) completely abandoning the
felonious behavior requirement and incorporating non-criminal activity,
(2) including a broad range of behaviors that are not limited to felonies,
(3) converting the two-part test into an either/or test, or (4) adding
129
broadening language to the list of acts subject to punishment.
When school districts promulgate policies that deviate from state
law, they are “expos[ing] students to punishment for off-campus
130
behavior beyond the authority granted by the Legislature.” Given this
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130

Id. at 257-58, 264; see also N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:16-7.6.
G.D.M., 427 N.J. Super. at 262.
Id. at 266.
Waldman, supra note 77, at 30.
Id.
Id. at 37.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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current potential for school districts to discipline students in a manner
that violates state law, it is incumbent on legislatures to pass more
detailed laws that directly address the legality of 24-hour codes and
better ensure school district compliance with state law.
D. 24-Hour Codes Held Unconstitutionally Vague As
Enforced
Besides potentially exceeding state law, student discipline for offcampus conduct can also create an unconstitutional application of state
131
law. In one such instance, high school senior Kyle Packer was pulled
132
over in his local Connecticut town for not wearing a seat belt. During
the traffic stop, the police officer arrested Packer for drug possession
after spotting a marijuana cigarette, performing a car search, and finding
133
drug paraphernalia along with two ounces of marijuana. After learning
of Packer’s arrest, the local school board held a hearing and voted to
expel Packer for a semester and prohibit him from extracurricular
134
activities for a year.
Packer sued to reverse his expulsion. Under Connecticut state law,
a student may only be disciplined for off-campus conduct when the
135
conduct is “seriously disruptive of the educational process.” The court
reviewed this off-campus discipline statute, applied it to the facts of
Packer’s case, and said:
“A person of ordinary intelligence, apprised only of the language [of
the state law] and our prior interpretation . . . of similar language,
could not be reasonably certain whether possession of marijuana in
the trunk of a car, off school grounds after school hours, is, by itself
and without some tangible nexus to school operation, ‘seriously
disruptive of the educational process’ as required by [state law] in
136
order to subject a student to expulsion.”

Under the void for vagueness doctrine,
131

137

the court found

Packer v. Bd. of Educ. of Thomaston, 717 A.2d 117, 124 (Conn. 1998).
Id. at 121.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 122-23.
135
In Connecticut, state law allows districts to discipline for off-campus conduct if the
conduct is (1) violative of a publicized board policy and (2) “seriously disruptive of the
educational process.” Packer, 717 A.2d at 122 n.7 (Conn. 1998) (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. §
10-233(d)(a)(1)).
136
Packer, 717 A.2d at 130.
137
“The void for vagueness is a procedural due process concept that originally was
132
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Connecticut law did not provide Packer with sufficient notice that his
marijuana possession would be subject to school discipline, and
138
reversed his expulsion accordingly.
While this decision is only dispositive under the operative facts, it
highlights the ways in which school districts can unconstitutionally
apply state statutes governing off-campus conduct. In the Packer case,
the school district made its own determination that Packer’s marijuana
arrest was “seriously disruptive of the educational process,” as required
139
under state law to expel him. But the court rejected this conclusion by
the school board, holding that the school’s interpretation of state law is
“irrelevant” to a void for vagueness claim and that proper constitutional
notice must only come from the statute itself and relevant judicial
140
interpretations.
On a void-for-vagueness basis alone, many currently enacted 24hour codes are potentially unconstitutional applications of state law. For
example, in New Jersey, the relevant state law requires that off-campus
conduct “materially and substantially” interfere with the school’s
141
operation before it can become subject to discipline. Elucidating this
statutory phrase, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division
struck down the Ramapo policy which subjected any criminal offense to
school discipline, writing: “[A] student could be suspended from
participating in extracurricular activities as the result of receiving a
citation for littering on a municipal sidewalk. Nothing in [the state
142
statute] can be read to endorse such a result.” Based on this holding,
derived from the guarantees of due process contained in the fifth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States constitution.” Id. at 125. It requires a statute (1) provide
“fair warning . . . in language that the common world would understand, of what the law
intends to do if a certain line is passed[,]” and (2) “establish minimum guidelines to govern
their enforcement.” Id.
138
“To summarize, we conclude that . . . the statute, as drafted, did not provide the
plaintiff with constitutionally adequate notice that possession of two ounces of marijuana in
the trunk of his car off the school grounds in the town of Morris, after school hours, without
any tangible nexus to the operation of Thomaston High School, would subject him to
expulsion[.]” Id. at 134.
139
The school district argued the arrest met this standard because (1) the student’s
brother was present for the arrest, causing his friends at school to become aware of the
arrest, (2) a former high school student who is a known drug user was present for the arrest,
and (3) teachers had approached the principal with respect to the arrest. Id. at 122.
140
Id. at 131, 134.
141
See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:16-7.6.
142
G.D.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Ramapo Indian Hills Reg’l High Sch. Dist., 427 N.J.
Super. 246, 266 (2012).
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does an off-campus speeding ticket, which is currently addressed by
some New Jersey 24-hour codes, meet this standard, or would it fail
143
under the void-for-vagueness doctrine?
In this light, many 24-hour codes that are currently enforced by
school districts have the potential of being unconstitutionally void for
vagueness under state law. As a result, legislatures must pass new laws
that better address 24-hour codes. Such laws must provide sufficient
guidance so that school officials are not left to make discretionary
decisions that are unconstitutionally vague as applied under the
governing state statute.
E. Judicial Standards Resulting in 24-Hour Codes Evading
Review
Even when parents or students undertake the effort of challenging
a 24-hour code, they face obstacles presented by the judicial standards
of review that apply to school disciplinary decisions. In cases where
students seek prompt review, legal recourse is typically only available
through an emergent relief petition. Such a petition, while heard
144
promptly by a judge, is subject to a heightened standard of review. In
the Wayne Hills case, as discussed in the introduction, the suspended
student athletes sued seeking emergent relief, as their suspensions
jeopardized participation in a state championship football game that was
145
less than one week away. There, the New Jersey Commissioner of
Education held that the students were unable to sustain their burden of
146
proof under the state’s emergent relief standard. This meant the
students could not demonstrate, as required by law, a likelihood of
prevailing on the underlying merits of the suit or that the legal right
147
underlying their claim was settled law.
143

See supra notes 33-35.
In New Jersey, emergent relief may be granted if the judge determines from the
proofs that (1) the petitioner will suffer irreparable harm if the requested relief is not
granted, (2) the legal right underlying the petitioner’s claim is settled, (3) the petitioner has a
likelihood of prevailing on the merits of the underlying claim, and (4) when the equities and
interests of the parties are balanced, the petitioner will suffer greater harm than the
respondent will suffer if the relief is not granted. Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126, 132-34
(1982).
145
L.A. ex rel R.A. v. Bd. of Educ. of Wayne, EDU 14241-11, Initial Decision (Dec. 1,
2010).
146
L.A. ex rel R.A. v. Bd. of Educ. of Wayne, EDU 14241-11, Final Decision (Dec. 2,
2010).
147
L.A., supra note 145.
144
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On another legal point, the administrative law judge emphasized
that the Wayne Township Board of Education’s decision to suspend the
148
football players was entitled to deference. Citing case law, the judge
held that a school board “has broad discretion to take the actions needed
to effectively operate its public schools,” and that based on this
standard, a court “will not substitute [its] judgment for that of the board
of education” unless there is “a finding that the action below was
149
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.” As a result, the judge said the
students “have to demonstrate that the Board acted in bad faith, or in
150
utter disregard of the circumstances before it.” The judge concluded
the board “amply demonstrated a nexus” between the alleged incident
and school operations, and that “the Board’s determination that [the
accused students] should not be permitted to participate in extra151
curricular activities is entitled to deference by the Commissioner.”
As an attorney for the Wayne Hills football players pointed out in
an interview, the administrative law judge and the Commissioner of
Education never actually reached “a decision on the underlying merits
152
of the case.” Rather, the case was dismissed because of the players’
153
inability to overcome the emergent relief and deference standards.
With these heightened standards of review applied to school
disciplinary decisions, there is effectively no judicial review of school
administrative decisions. This is a rather troubling reality, as school
administrators are left to interpret state law with effectively no appeal to
determine the legality or constitutionality of their decision making. As
the Connecticut Supreme Court noted in Packer, school administrators
154
are not constitutionally “authorized to construe” state law. Therefore,
legislatures should pass new laws that ensure students and parents can
obtain some form of due process review under 24-hour codes, thus
ensuring that state law is properly interpreted and applied in the school
setting.
148

Id. (citing Thomas v. Morris Twp. Bd. of Educ., 89 N.J. Super. 327, 332 (App. Div.
1965), aff’d, 46 N.J. 581).
149
Id.; Kopera v. W. Orange Bd. of Educ., 60 N.J. Super. 288, 294 (App. Div. 1960).
150
L.A., supra note 143.
151
Id.
152
McGrath, supra note 25 (The education commissioner “wrote that lawyers proved
the players would suffer irreparable harm by not playing in the championship game, but that
lawyers failed to prove that they are likely to win their underlying appeal of the
suspensions.”).
153
Id.
154
Packer v. Bd. of Educ. of Thomaston, 717 A.2d 117, 131 (Conn. 1998).
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F. Structural Reasons Causing School Districts to Exceed
State Law
Besides legal considerations, there are several structural reasons
why state laws governing 24-hour codes are often ignored by school
districts. These factors include disincentives for school board members
to oppose the implementation of 24-hour codes, incentives for school
administrators to support 24-hour codes, as well as disincentives for
parents to challenge 24-hour codes. Based on these realities, it is
incumbent on state legislatures to create regimes that better ensure
school districts comply with the laws they promulgate.
First, there are political disincentives for school board members to
oppose 24-hour codes when they are proposed at the local level. For
example, the Holmdel, New Jersey Board of Education passed a policy
that disciplines students for motor vehicle violations occurring outside
155
of school. Holmdel High School principal William Loughran
promoted the policy at a board of education meeting, arguing “it’s one
of those things that defines the values of a community . . . [f]rom our
156
perspective we think it’s a good thing.” Despite concerns raised by
board members about the policy violating state law, the board majority
157
repeatedly approved the policy over dissent. One board member
openly disagreed with the policy, but was persuaded by the principal
into supporting the 24-hour code, saying “[i]f [the students] are safer
158
because of something we are doing, then we have to go with that.” As
this quote highlights, it is politically challenging to oppose a measure
that school administrators argue promotes student safety—even if it
likely violates state law.

155

See Hlavenka, supra note 35.
Id.
157
The Holmdel Township Board of Education voted 5-4 to defeat a motion to place a
moratorium on the off-campus driving policy. Proponents of the moratorium,
including the author of this Note, argued the off-campus policy exceeded the scope
of state law: “‘We cannot establish some link as required in the statute,’ Collins
said. ‘[The policy] amounts to a blanket authorization . . . that is illegal and in
violation of statute.’”
Jacqueline Hlavenka, Holmdel Board of Education split on off-campus policies,
INDEPENDENT (Monmouth Cty., N.J.), Oct. 7, 2010, http://ind.gmnews.com/news/2010-1007/Front_Page/Holmdel_Board_of_Education_split_on_offcampus_poli.html.
158
Hlavenka, supra note 35.
156
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The actions in the Ramapo, New Jersey school district further
illustrate the political difficulty for school board members to oppose 24hour codes on legal grounds. In this district, Superintendent Paul Saxton
advocated for a 24-hour code after conducting a survey in 2005 that
revealed high percentages of high school students consume alcohol at
159
home without parental knowledge. Supposedly in response, Saxton
and the board of education passed a 24-hour code meant to be a
“deterrent of drug and alcohol abuse” that subjected students to
discipline for any off-campus conduct that resulted in an alleged
“violation of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, and/or
160
applicable municipal codes or ordinances.”
The New Jersey
Commissioner of Education struck down this 24-hour code for violating
161
state law. Remarkably, the school board then passed another proposed
24-hour code that made minimal changes—and which was also struck
162
drown in a subsequent facial challenge. This back-and-forth reinforces
that there are political disincentives for school board members to
oppose 24-hour codes when proposed, even if courts have struck down
previous iterations of the policy.
Second, there are potential incentives for school administrators to
advocate for 24-hour codes, even if they may violate state law. To this
point, school boards and school administrators have repeatedly argued
they should be able to define state law as it relates to student
163
discipline. With such autonomy to interpret state law, though, school
administrators and board members have the potential “to indulge their
164
personal predilections.” For example, some school administrators have
159
G.D.M. and T.A.M. o/b/o B.M.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Ramapo Indian Hills Reg’l
High Sch. Dist. (B.M.M. I), EDU 11597-09, Initial Decision (June 11, 2010).
160
G.D.M. and T.A.M. o/b/o B.M.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Ramapo Indian Hills Reg’l
High Sch. Dist. (B.M.M. II), EDU 11597-09, Final Decision (Sept. 13, 2010).
161
Id.
162
An administrative law judge held that the newly-written policy suffers from the same
infirmity as the original policy. G.D.M. and T.A.M. o/b/o B.M.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of the
Ramapo Indian Hills Reg’l High Sch. Dist. (B.M.M. I), EDU 11579-09, Initial Decision
(June 11, 2010).
163
The Connecticut Association of Boards of Education argued that school board
members should be able to define applicable state law as they see fit, holding “the board
members’ knowledge and experience . . . enable[s] them to put a framework to a situation
and determine if a situation is serious enough to warrant expulsion.” Brief for Conn. Ass’n
of Bds. of Educ. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Packer v. Bd. of Educ. of
Thomaston, 717 A.2d 117 (Conn. 1998).
164
Brief for Conn. Civil Liberties Union Found. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Packer v. Bd. of Educ. of Thomaston, 717 A.2d 117 (Conn. 1998)
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personal views that can color the interpretation of the applicable state
law. In the Ramapo school district, the superintendent made clear that
he personally supported a 24-hour code because he openly believed
165
parents were failing at raising their children. Similarly, Superintendent
Barbara Duncan of the Holmdel Township Public Schools advocated for
a 24-hour code because she believed the school district properly acted
166
as a student’s parent during the school day.
Beyond personal beliefs, there are also educational incentives that
weigh on school districts to discipline and remove poorly behaved
167
students. Researchers reviewed school policies intended to increase
the number of suspensions and found that schools are incentivized to
remove these students because they often score poorly on standardized
exams, parents want disruptive students out of their children’s
168
classrooms, and teachers can get rid of troublemakers. Overall, there
are incentives for school administrators and board members to support
24-hour codes regardless of legal concerns.
Finally, there are also disincentives for parents to challenge 24hour codes. The Connecticut Civil Liberties Union Foundation stated
there is an overall “difficulty in challenging the decisions of school
169
officials.” To this end, research has shown that in school matters,
“many parents often do not have the mindset, time, or means to pursue
170
redress.” Further, when parents actually do have the resources to sue,
they often end up feeling “ostracized, frustrated, and unsuccessful” in
171
challenging the school system. With this reduced likelihood that
parents will take the time to challenge 24-hour codes in court, there is
an increased likelihood that illegal 24-hour codes will evade judicial
review.
(“Permitting expulsion for conduct away from school that is deemed to be ‘seriously
disruptive of the educational process’ invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement and
permits school officials to indulge their personal predilections.”).
165
“If I thought the parents were dealing with them, we wouldn’t be doing this,” he said
in an interview. G.D.M. and T.A.M. o/b/o B.M.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Ramapo Indian
Hills Reg’l High Sch. Dist. (B.M.M. I), EDU 11579-09, Initial Decision (June 11, 2010).
166
“I don’t see the school being so distant from the family . . . Basically, we are filling
the role of being a parent to a student during the day.” Hlavenka, supra note 83.
167
Jarboe, supra note 88, at 353.
168
Id.
169
Brief for Conn. Civil Liberties Union Found. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Packer v. Bd. of Educ. of Thomaston, 717 A.2d 117 (Conn. 1998).
170
Hanson, supra note 80, at 295.
171
Id.
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Overall, as this section discusses, there are several perverse
structural reasons that can lead to school district noncompliance with
state law. As a result, corrective legislation is needed to ensure that state
laws are properly complied with at the local level and that districts do
not continually “expose[] students to punishment for off-campus
172
behavior beyond the authority granted by the Legislature.”
IV. Proposed Legislation and Conclusions
As explained in the previous sections, 24-hour codes present
numerous legal and policy concerns. In many cases, the codes have the
potential of violating students’ procedural due process rights and
173
parents’ substantive due process rights. At the same time, they
constitute poor public policy for a variety of reasons, including taking
at-risk youth away from extra-curricular programs that would help them
and otherwise creating a double penalty that supersedes the criminal
174
justice system.
Currently, many states, including New Jersey, have rightfully
passed laws that restrict school discipline for off-campus offenses to
175
specific instances.
School districts, however, have repeatedly
176
exceeded these state laws, and given the standards of review that
apply in such cases, there is little to no judicial review to ensure school
177
district compliance with state law. In this light, states should pass laws
that more effectively circumscribe the practice of discipline for offcampus conduct. In order to attain this goal, this Note recommends
legislation that takes into account the following considerations.
First, the law should cite the specific criminal offenses that are
potentially subject to school discipline for off-campus conduct. This
would prevent indecorously broad interpretations of the law by school
districts, such as those holding that minor traffic offenses directly affect
a school’s operation. This section of the law should also expressly state
that school districts cannot discipline for offenses that are not
178
enumerated in the statute.
172
173
174
175
176
177
178

Waldman, supra note 77, at 37.
See supra Part 2A, 2B.
See supra notes 78-79.
See supra note 110.
See supra Part 3C.
See supra Part 3E.
Waldman, supra note 77, at 31.
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Second, the law should create a due process appeal as of right to
the local school board whenever discipline for off-campus conduct
occurs. This would reduce the likelihood of school administrators
potentially making determinations in contradiction of the applicable
179
state law, as in the Packer case. Further, this would also create a
procedural due process opportunity to receive notice and a hearing, as
required by the Fourteenth Amendment when there is a constitutionally180
protected liberty interest involved.
Third, the law should establish a more permissive standard of
review in case a student files a challenge to off-campus discipline with
the New Jersey Department of Education. Currently, between the
emergent review and deference standards, the Commissioner of
Education cannot reverse a board decision absent bad faith by a school
board. This should change so that a student can receive a proper review
of a school board’s final decision to ensure compliance with state law,
rather than being prevented from obtaining review based on applicable
judicial standard.
Finally, the law should restrict discipline for off-campus conduct to
suspensions that are remedial to ensuring the safety of the school
environment. This would allow the criminal justice system to serve its
goals of deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution, while the school
181
codes would serve to preserve order in the school environment. This
would also ensure that the school discipline does not violate substantive
182
due process by assuming a parental role in the upbringing of a child.
Further, it would ensure that students are not counterproductively
removed from extracurricular activities that prove beneficial in
183
preventing misconduct.
Although arguably well-intentioned, 24-hour codes create larger
problems than the ills they are supposedly intended to address. As
discussed in the introduction, in less than one month, the Wayne Hills
football players accused of off-campus malfeasance had their eligibility
status changed three times. This convoluted process did not make
national headlines because of the troublesome allegations against the
players, but rather the confusion over whether the school could have or
179
180
181
182
183

See generally Palmer by Palmer v. Merluzzi, 868 F.2d 90, 93 (3d Cir. 1989)
Id.
See Peden, supra note 79; Hanson, supra note 80.
See generally Hanson, supra note 80.
See Hanson, supra note 80.
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should have disciplined the students. To this point, according to most
accounts, the Wayne Hills school environment never became dangerous
because of fallout from the alleged assault, but rather because of the
184
public controversy over the players’ status. If state law had defined
and limited the school’s role regarding this off-campus incident, there
would have been no public controversy. But ambiguity in the law led to
incredulity among the public.
This Note does not dispute the duty and need of a school district to
maintain an orderly school environment. The 24-hour codes that are
currently being promulgated by school districts, though, exceed this role
and instead extend schools into a troubling area with harsh policy and
legal consequences. As a result, states must take affirmative steps to
prevent school districts from becoming mired in the adjudication of
tangential off-campus misconduct. This can straightforwardly be
accomplished through passage of new state laws that are drafted in
accordance with this Note's recommendations. With such reform, law
enforcement can focus on enforcing the law, teachers can focus on
teaching, and students can focus on learning. What is more,
administrators can focus on running their schools, such that principals
are not, figuratively, driving the cop car.

184
Bob Cook, Wayne Hills Football 9 Who Were Out, Then In, Are Out Again,
FORBES.COM, Nov. 28, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/bobcook/2011/11/28/wayne-hillsfootball-9-who-were-out-then-in-are-out-again/ (“[T]he board said things had changed,
including the ‘reversal by the high school principals, which now, is that this issue is
disrupting the daily operations in the buildings.’”).

